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Abstract
This study examines the drivers of the steady decline in South Africa’s private sector labour share 
between 1971 and 2019. The focus on South Africa is instructive as its distributional contestation 
is bounded in a matrix of racial conflict. Crucial reforms on trade, finance and welfare were 
undertaken since 1994, but the study finds little evidence that the extension of the franchise 
promoted egalitarianism, since white economic elites invested in de facto political power. This 
study employs an Unrestricted Error Correction Model to estimate the drivers of the private 
sector labour share, and the findings suggest that globalisation, financialisation and public spending 
have decreased the labour share, while the effects of education have been positive but insufficient 
to halt the decline.
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Introduction
South Africa has the highest income inequality in the world – the income share of its top 
10% (more than 60% of national income) exceeds its peers in the USA, Brazil and India 
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– and is even higher than the Middle East region (Assouad et al., 2018). A number of 
studies have documented this extreme level of income inequality, albeit using different 
data sources, time periods and dimensions of inequality – principally top incomes and 
wage inequality (Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010; Hundenborn et al., 2019; Leibbrandt 
et al., 2000, 2012; Mosomi and Wittenberg, 2020; Wittenberg, 2017a, 2017b). However, 
fewer studies have focused on functional income distribution, with Kaseeram and 
Mahadea (2015) and Burger (2015) as notable exceptions; however, they focus on the 
post-1994 period and use fewer explanatory variables.
In this article, we estimate the drivers of South Africa’s functional income inequality 
from 1971 to 2019 – the longest period covered in such a study on South Africa so far. 
Our interest is focused on documenting and explaining the dynamics of the private sector 
wage share due to the combination of high-income inequality and anaemic growth in 
South Africa (Makgetla, 2004), which presents important lessons for other racially 
divided societies, with a long history of legally entrenched racial hierarchies, like Brazil 
or the Southern USA. Moreover, our focus on the labour share allows us to capture not 
only the degree of the employer–employee distributional conflict but also the extent of 
racial exploitation over a longer period as compared to previous studies. Conflict over 
wage negotiation and the resulting wage share is a commonly used measure of cost com-
petitiveness, and this study empirically identifies the political and economic institutions 
that underpin its dynamics.
The absence of sufficiently long time series data on the racial distribution of income 
restricts our study to the labour share. However, we draw the reader’s attention to three 
key facts: (a) black South Africans account for 74% of the employed in 2017, as com-
pared to 11% for white South Africans (Mosomi and Wittenberg, 2020); (b) black South 
Africans earn 25% of white South African wage income in 2017 (Mosomi and Wittenberg, 
2020); (c) employers and top management are primarily white South Africans (Alvaredo 
and Atkinson, 2010; Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Though there is no one-to-one map-
ping of these facts to the evolution of the private sector wage share, we expect black 
South Africans to be disproportionately affected by changes in the labour share. Ergo, the 
latter can be interpreted as indirect evidence of the evolution of the racial distribution of 
income.
For the period under consideration, we observe a steady decline in the wage share 
from 1971, with substantial decreases in 1980 and the late 1990s to early 2000s. However, 
the secular decline stabilised between 2002 and 2009, and has since trended upwards. It 
is interesting that for the majority of the period, including the post-1994 democratisation 
period, the labour share has trended downwards. What are the factors that explain the 
observed patterns? This is the motivating question for this study. The empirical literature 
on the drivers of wage shares in advanced economies concludes that deunionisation, 
withdrawal of the welfare state, globalisation and financialisation have all contributed to 
rising functional income inequality since the 1980s (Alvarez, 2015; Bengtsson, 2014; 
Dünhaupt, 2017; Flaherty and Ó Riain, 2020; Gouzoulis, 2021; Kristal, 2010; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Stockhammer, 2017; Wood, 2017). Similar conclusions are 
drawn for the handful of studies that investigate the cases in emerging economies, which, 
however, focus on a limited number of explanatory factors (Guschanski and Onaran, 
2017; Ibarra and Ros, 2019; Jayadev and Narayan, 2020; Onaran, 2009).
Gouzoulis et al. 3
In this study, our methodological approach is two-fold. First, we provide historical 
and institutional analyses on how industrial relations, social welfare, globalisation and 
finance influence the balance of power between employees and employers. Second, we 
employ an Unrestricted Error Correction Model to estimate the drivers of the private 
sector labour share. We find strong evidence that the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
(FIRE) sectors, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, mortgage debt, public con-
sumption and trade openness decrease the private sector wage share. Further, educational 
attainment, measured by the Human Capital Index, and industrial action increase the 
private sector wage share.
Our results provide two main interesting insights on the inequality debate. First, our 
negative result for public consumption is atypical in the literature, even for the few stud-
ies on developing countries. Based on our historical analysis, this puzzle may be 
explained by discriminatory public welfare under apartheid, and fiscal austerity in demo-
cratic South Africa (Hunter et al., 2003). It follows that the nexus between public welfare 
and distribution may be undermined in multi-racial societies due to discrimination and 
political economy considerations, e.g. minority economic elites. Second, we find strong 
positive effects for education, but this is almost completely negated with similarly strong 
negative effects from the size of the FIRE sectors and mortgage indebtedness. Griffith-
Jones and Karwowski (2015) and Karwowski (2015, 2018) document the growth of the 
FIRE economy as a direct consequence of policies adopted after the end of apartheid. 
Given that white South Africans own a larger share of capital (Alvaredo and Atkinson, 
2010; Assouad et al., 2018), this finding shows how social mobility policies can be neu-
tralised, if initial capital ownership is highly concentrated. This result is strong evidence 
against the argument that income inequality can be reduced from the bottom up, at least 
in multi-racial societies.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature 
review. The third section discusses the political economy of income distribution in South 
Africa since the early 1970s. The fourth outlines our empirical strategy and data. The 
fifth reports our findings, and the sixth section concludes.
Determinants of income inequality: Theory and evidence
The extant literature on the determinants of the functional distribution of income stresses 
the roles of labour market institutions, the welfare state, trade and financial globalisation, 
and financialisation. Given the complex and ever-evolving nature of power relations in a 
society, different theories underline the importance of different channels that influence 
the employer–employee balance of power (Gouzoulis, 2021; Köhler et al., 2019; 
Stockhammer, 2017). The remainder of this section reviews these channels that co-deter-
mine the private sector functional distribution of income.
Labour militancy, power resources and segregation
The degree of labour market regulation and the state of employment relations have been 
identified as key determinants of income inequality by the Power Resources Theory 
(PRT) pioneered by Stephens (1979) and Korpi (1983). The lower the employment/
4 Economic and Industrial Democracy 00(0)
underemployment rate and the wider the coverage of centralised bargaining, the more 
powerful workers become in wage negotiation. Indeed, numerous studies report empiri-
cal evidence that unionisation, centralised bargaining coordination and strike activity 
lead to higher labour shares and less wage dispersion (Bengtsson, 2014; Cowling and 
Molho, 1982; Dell’Aringa and Pagani, 2007; Devicienti et al., 2019; Gouzoulis, 2021; 
Hancke, 2012; Kristal, 2010; Leslie and Pu, 1996; Pontusson, 2013).
Yet, the relationship between labour market coordination and inequalities is substan-
tially less straightforward in societies where bargaining coverage varies due to race and 
gender discrimination. In societies where racism is widespread, unions might primarily 
represent different ethnicities and races, thereby, they may undermine working class 
cohesion. It follows total union density can be an inappropriate measure of labour power 
for racially divided societies, and collective struggles over income distribution are more 
accurately measured by total strike activity and participation. Even in case studies like 
South Africa, a country with a rich trade union history and many ‘racially mixed’ unions, 
legislation imposed by apartheid restricted the rights of black unionised workers (Bhorat 
et al., 2015). Thus, even in this case, industrial action can be a better measure of workers’ 
collective power.
Public spending and welfare retrenchment
Beyond labour militancy and employment relations, PRT also emphasises the role of 
public welfare expenditures for bargaining outcomes. Increased welfare spending 
(including unemployment benefits) decreases the discrepancy between the average wage 
and the income of the unemployed, therefore employees feel safer to demand higher 
wages. An additional channel relates to the point that public expenditure increases 
demand and employment growth, thereby enhancing wage demands through weaker 
labour market competition.
Thus, a widely accepted assertion of the income distribution literature is that econo-
mies with extensive welfare states tend to be more egalitarian, while the steep rise in 
income inequality during the last four decades is largely associated with welfare state 
retrenchment (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009). Indeed, econometric studies on 
income distribution show that declining unionisation and strike activity, as well as wage 
bargaining decentralisation, have contributed to decreasing wage shares and rising earn-
ing dispersion (e.g. Bengtsson, 2014; Cowling and Molho, 1982; Dell’Aringa and 
Pagani, 2007; Devicienti et al., 2019; Gouzoulis, 2021; Kristal, 2010, 2013; Pontusson, 
2013).
Trade openness, capital mobility and the factors of production
The debates within political economy on whether trade globalisation and capital mobility 
benefit the abundant or the scarce factor of production date back to Stolper and Samuelson 
(1941). They posit that globalisation tends to increase wages in developing economies 
since labour is the abundant factor of production. In contrast, Gereffi et al. (2005) argue 
that the globalisation of commodity chains encourages relocation to low-wage countries, 
which disproportionately benefits the most mobile factor of production, i.e. capital 
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(Rodrik, 1997). According to this view, the intensified labour market competition induces 
a ‘global race to the bottom’ between workers of advanced and developing countries, 
who accept lower wages to attract investment.
Overall, there is strong evidence that trade openness, FDI flows and financial globali-
sation have decreased labour’s income share in advanced as well as developing econo-
mies. The ILO (2008) and IMF (2017) provide evidence that foreign assets and liabilities 
have contributed to the rise of functional income inequality. Also, Harrison (2002), 
Jayadev (2007), Onaran (2009), Stockhammer (2017) and Gouzoulis and Constantine 
(2021) report panel and time series evidence that trade and capital account openness and 
FDI have decreased the labour shares of both advanced and emerging economies. Finally, 
Böckerman and Maliranta (2012) empirically demonstrate that Finland’s export share 
causes intra-industry restructuring that decreases its labour share.
Financial dependency and the employer–employee balance of power
In early work, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) posit a non-linear relationship 
between financial development and income distribution. They argue that the richest 
social groups have disproportionate access to credit during the early stages of finan-
cial development, which engenders income inequality. However, beyond some thresh-
old level of financial development, access for the poor increases and lowers income 
inequality. But Claessens and Perotti (2007) note that vested interests in unequal soci-
eties can impose barriers and undermine equal access to credit. Strikingly, even when 
the poor households become financialised, they usually accumulate debt rather than 
investment income to keep up with the Joneses and/or counterbalance inadequate 
public welfare.
Evidence shows that household indebtedness and the associated fear of default make 
employees more likely to accept lower wages and avoid union participation (Froud et al., 
2002; Gouzoulis, 2021; Grady and Simms, 2019; Langley, 2007; Wood, 2017). Financial 
development also promotes firm-level debt, and job losses and wage cuts are common 
strategies to protect corporate balance sheets (Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000; Thompson, 2003). Furthermore, the increase in non-financial corporations’ finan-
cial profits (Krippner, 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011) makes growth less 
dependent on labour and, consequently, lowers labour shares (Alvarez, 2015; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Overall, increases in inequalities due to financialisation tend 
to be larger in economies with weaker labour market institutions (Argitis and Dafermos, 
2013; Gouzoulis, 2021; Wood, 2017).
Industrialisation, skill upgrading and long-run inequality
The seminal studies of Lewis (1954, 1955) and Kuznets (1955) theorise and map the 
inequality–industrialisation–growth nexus. Lewis (1955) identifies differentials in sav-
ing rates and productive expenditures as the key mechanisms behind inequality. In pre-
capitalist agricultural societies, the main source of income for the wealthy social groups 
is land rents, which do not require significant investment spending. In industrialised 
economies, a larger share of profits is related to industrial investment, which requires 
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expenditures on raw materials, innovation and labour costs. Therefore, the rise of new 
high-wage sectors during industrialisation creates a divided economy, with the agricul-
tural sector paying lower wages. As the economy gradually develops and becomes indus-
trialised, labour moves toward the high-productivity, high-wage sectors, thus, inequality 
declines.
Contrariwise, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) claim that the co-occurrence of rising 
growth and declining inequality before the early 1980s was the outcome of radical pro-
labour reforms, rather than the result of the trickle-down effects of industrialisation. 
Moreover, recent long-run evidence shows that the Lewis/Kuznets curve is inverted in 
many advanced and developing economies (Piketty, 2014, 2020). Indeed, industrialisa-
tion may not necessarily induce a smooth skill upgrading and workforce movement to 
high-wage sectors in racially divided societies. As argued in the next section, South 
Africa is a good example where this process has been far from smooth. Relevant anti-
Kuznets evidence is presented by Jayadev and Narayan (2020), who show that privatisa-
tion, technology, concentration and informalisation induced a steep decline in India’s 
wage shares since 1983. In contrast, Ibarra and Ros (2019) attribute the decline in 
Mexico’s labour share between 1990 and 2015 to the first phase of a Kuznets cycle.
The political economy of South Africa’s income 
distribution
The election victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948 is considered the starting point 
of apartheid, which refers to institutionalised racism against black South Africans. 
Though the apartheid regime lasted from 1948 to 1994, it went through different phases 
due to internal struggles and international pressures.
The rise and fall of apartheid are identified under three periods (Posel, 2011): (1) The 
1950s, where black South Africans could live in cities as long as their work was neces-
sary for the white urban citizens. Black South Africans who already lived in cities were 
allowed to stay, but a clear separation between white and black neighbourhoods was 
established through buffer zones. (2) The 1960s, the peak of apartheid, when the state 
displaced a ‘surplus’ black African population of about 3.5 million people to segregated, 
self-governing homelands. Due to the distinct political authority in the new homelands, 
the central government was not responsible for the welfare and education of displaced 
black South Africans. (3) The 1970s–1994 era, when economic conditions, protests and 
rebellions induced a ‘reformist’ turn, as compared to the earlier phases.
Given that the majority of the working class population in the country has been his-
torically black South Africans and the majority of employers white South Africans, a key 
question that emerges is how the employment relationship in South Africa evolved since 
the early decline of the apartheid regime. As noted earlier, existing studies on functional 
income distribution in South Africa cover only the post-1994 period and explore a lim-
ited number of explanatory factors that do not cover the full extent of institutional 
restructuring that took place since the early 1970s (Burger, 2015; Kaseeram and Mahadea, 
2015). Given the review of relevant literature, overviewing important determinants of 
the employer–employee conflict related to globalisation, capital flows, housing and 
finance is a major omission.
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Figure 1 reports the evolution of the private sector wage share in South Africa from 
1971 to 2019. Following Stockhammer (2017), the private sector wage share is defined 
as the ratio of ‘Compensation of employees to GDP at factor cost’.1 The data are sourced 
from the South African Central Reserve Bank (SARB), and exclude self-employment 
income and fringe benefits. However, we are not concerned with under-estimating the 
private sector wage share for two reasons. First, the peak ratio of social benefits to com-
pensation of employees is only 0.89% according to SARB. Second, while data on self-
employment income are only available after 1995, black South Africans had few 
opportunities for self-employment during apartheid and the size of the self-employed 
remains relatively small even after 1994 (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011; Seekings, 2007).
Further, our focus on the private sector wage share, as opposed to the total or public 
sector wage share, allows us to evaluate the intensity of the traditional capital–labour 
conflict. Conceptually, centring on the private sector wage share is important given that 
functional income distribution theories generally focus on interactions and negotiations 
between private employers and employees, since the nature of employment relations in 
the government sector tends to be very different. Also, the use of the private sector wage 
share enables this study to test the hypothesis that the extent of government welfare 
affects employer–employee wage bargaining. Since we employ government consump-
tion as a proxy measure for public welfare, this work avoids endogeneity issues by 
excluding the public sector wage bill.2 Additionally, the promise of democracy and the 
end of apartheid is that both functional and racial income inequality would decrease in 
the private sector. This work allows us to evaluate whether this promise was kept. 
Moreover, for the period under consideration, the South African economy had experi-
enced significant changes in its political institutions and production structure, and 
Figure 1. Private sector wage share (% GDP), 1971–2019.
Source: Authors’ calculation using SARB data.
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undergone extensive reforms relating to trade, finance and labour relations targeted at the 
private sector. A fundamental objective of this work is to appraise the distributional cre-
dentials of these reforms. The rest of this section discusses the political and economic 
institutions in South Africa, and how they relate to the post-1970 trend of functional 
income inequality.
Segregation and industrial relations under apartheid: 1970–1990
South Africa grew rapidly from 1960 to the early 1970s, mainly due to the FDI inflows 
and the exchange controls that prevented capital flight, which boosted manufacturing 
production through giant conglomerates. Consequently, this led to employment 
growth for black South Africans (Lodge, 2011). The FDI-induced economic pressures 
incentivised the state to direct industry towards areas closer to the homelands, which 
brought some limited prosperity in these areas in terms of improved educational 
attainment and some black workers being employed in relatively more skilled roles, 
such as teachers, managers or civil servants (Lodge, 2011). ‘Limited prosperity’ 
describes the relative poverty reduction due to the trickle-down effects of industriali-
sation, which came with rising income inequality, high overall unemployment and 
limited social security. Notwithstanding the misreported social statistics by official 
authorities (Alenda-Demoutiez and Mügge, 2020), the rise of inequalities for black 
workers during this period is widely acknowledged (Griep et al., 2014; Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: Ch. 5).
This emerging reality created new demands for more political rights (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: 105) and led to the formation of black trade unions (Godfrey et al., 2007). 
Initially, many unions were led by leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
maintained a top-down structure in terms of decision-making power. However, Buhlungu 
(2009) contends that they gradually became more inclusive with democratically elected 
union leaders. Independent black trade unions organised strikes over wages in 1973, 
which led to the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1973 that assigned some limited rights 
to black workers but ultimately disempowered their unions (Budeli, 2012). Yet, despite 
their largely progressive role, it is worth highlighting that not all unions were strictly 
‘workerist’ per se or ‘politically coordinated’ in all cases.
The ensuing industrial conflict combined with international pressures coerced the 
government to establish the Wiehahn Commission, and its 1979 report suggested that 
employees should be granted full rights to association independent of race, religion or 
gender, and argued for the establishment of an Industrial Court (Lichtenstein, 2019). The 
apartheid state accepted most proposals and removed the racial elements of the Bantu 
Act, which allowed the creation of several new fully autonomous trade unions in the 
early 1980s. The new industrial relations model allowed black workers to institutionalise 
their broader anti-apartheid struggle (Finnemore and Van der Merwe, 1992). Furthermore, 
the social security system steadily expanded to the black population, reducing benefits 
and pensions inequalities. Indicatively, the real increase in the pensions of black South 
Africans between 1970 and 1993 was 7.3%, but major inequalities persisted since black 
pensioners kept receiving significantly less than white pensioners as a share of the aver-
age wage (Van der Berg, 1997).
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Several social uprisings led by black workers and students occurred during this early 
phase of the anti-apartheid struggle. The two more important revolts were the 1976–77 
student-led uprising in Soweto and the 1984–86 popular rebellion (Murray, 1989). In the 
context of the latter revolt, a major national institution emerged in 1985: the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the successor of the Federation of South African 
Trade Unions (FOSATU) which was established five years earlier. The ‘Social Movement 
Unionism’ model of COSATU allowed it to play an important role in the industrial ter-
rain, but also in the fight for the end of apartheid (Budeli, 2012; Hirschsohn, 1998). 
Notwithstanding continued attacks against union leaders between 1988 and 1990, the 
intensified struggle led to the unbanning of the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
and the ANC, which together with COSATU formed the Tripartite Alliance after the 
release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990. In addition, during the same period, the 
Pan African Congress (PAC) was also unbanned.
South Africa in transition: Globalisation, finance and inequality
The racial conflict episodes of the 1988–90 period and the intensified international sanc-
tions of the 1980s triggered the fall of apartheid. Negotiations between the NP and the 
ANC took place between 1990 and 1992, which resulted in an agreement for the first free 
elections in 1994 when Mandela was elected the first post-apartheid president of South 
Africa.
Despite its radical agenda during the late apartheid and early transition years, the 
ANC quickly adopted a moderate stance against business leaders and softened its views 
on nationalisation and regulation of key industries (Nattrass, 1994).3 Given the ANC’s 
newly adopted market-oriented approach, it sought to reconcile capital–labour–state 
relations through the 1996 Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeco-
nomic strategy. The GEAR plan aimed to boost private investment and employment 
through fiscal austerity and the liberalisation of the labour market (Streak, 2004). The 
policy intervention included negative real interest rate policies and tax breaks for firms, 
but employers responded by increasing capital intensity and the employment of the bet-
ter-trained workforce. Inevitably, the latter was smaller due to the under-provision of 
education for black South Africans (Moll, 1996; Nattrass, 2014), and higher capital 
intensity decreased their wages. Consequently, since 1994, the total unemployment rate 
in the country has been increasing steadily reaching almost 30 and 40% according to the 
strict and the expanded definitions, respectively (Alenda-Demoutiez and Mügge, 2020).
Regarding wage coordination, the establishment of an employer–employee negotiation 
framework and associations of business owners achieved the establishment of basic labour 
market institutions, which initiated the democratisation of the workplace. This allowed 
some coordination between employers and employees in the country. On the one hand, 
certain trade unions acknowledged the wage–employment–profitability trade-off and 
accepted productivity-related bonuses at the expense of basic wages (Nattrass, 1995). On 
the other hand, unions rejected the possibility of stopping mass strikes and regional wage 
setting (Nattrass, 1997). However, these reforms have not fully succeeded in addressing 
racial divisions of the past, hence cooperation between white and black business owners, as 
well as between employers and employees remains dysfunctional (Bischoff et al., 2021). 
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Also, it is worth noting that despite the fact that the number of trade unions both in the 
private and the public sectors grew substantially after 1994, their membership dynamics 
follow distinct trajectories (Bhorat et al., 2015): union members in the public sector 
increased from 835,795 in 1997 to 1,393,189 in 2013, and the union density of the sector 
grew from 55.2% to 69.2%. Contrariwise, in the private sector, union membership between 
1997 and 2013 increased only by approximately 50,000 persons, while private sector union 
density shrunk from 35.6 to 24.4% during the same period.
Limited privatisations were also used by the state as a means of partially restoring 
historical injustices. More specifically, the unbundling of white-owned private corpora-
tions and the privatisation of certain assets of the apartheid state favoured the emergence 
of a small black business elite, while a limited group of black professionals enjoyed 
promotions due to affirmative action policies (Adams et al., 1997). However, these black 
empowerment policies within the private and the public sectors reached only a minority 
of politically affiliated insiders, with the majority of black employees remaining poor 
and excluded (Andreasson, 2006; Hartshorn and Sil, 2019; Michie, 2020; Nattrass, 2014; 
World Bank, 2018). Interestingly, Habib and Padayachee (2000) challenge the de facto 
deracialising character of these privatisations, since the new black businesses are 
financed by foreign and white South Africans. Despite the fact that social grants provi-
sion has expanded to almost 50% of the population (Waidler and Devereux, 2019), these 
phenomena of exclusion and poor public service delivery, especially in the former black 
homelands, have often triggered violent local protests with some support by trade union-
ists (Alexander, 2010; Alexander and Pfaffe, 2014).
Beyond policies related to the domestic market, the ANC had undertaken extensive 
trade and capital account liberalisation. For example, foreign exchange controls were 
removed in the mid-1990s and led to significant investment volatility due to fluctuations in 
FDI and portfolio capital flows. Moreover, the end of international sanctions after apart-
heid accelerated trade integration and capital inflows. These capital and investment inflows 
induced an asset price boom, which exposed South Africa to international financial fragil-
ity (Isaacs and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). In contrast to what the state expected, openness did 
not have a positive impact on employment but led to higher unemployment especially in 
the manufacturing sectors (Jenkins, 2008). The continuing rise in unemployment since 
1994 has been particularly harmful to black South Africans, who experienced dramatically 
higher rates due to the long-lasting effects of apartheid (Alenda-Demoutiez and Mügge, 
2020). Indian and coloured South Africans also suffer from higher unemployment rates 
compared to white South Africans, whilst unemployment rates are remarkably higher for 
women across all racial categories (Alenda-Demoutiez and Mügge, 2020).
Several studies argue that white South African business leaders have unsuccessfully 
lobbied for financial liberalisation since the late 1970s (Davies et al., 1985; Habib and 
Padayachee, 2000). However, it is after the 1990s that the South African financial devel-
opment model attempted to increase competition in the financial sector and break up large 
commercial banks and non-banking financial institutions, but ultimately this process 
rather exacerbated concentration. This transformation led to two key structural changes 
within the non-financial sectors of the economy. First, since the 1990s, non-financial cor-
porations (NFCs) started investing heavily in risky financial assets rather than innovation 
and productive activities (Andreoni et al., 2021). Second, since the mid-1990s, South 
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Africa experienced a massive credit-fuelled residential housing bubble, which remains 
dramatically larger compared to most emerging economies and very close to the trend of 
the Anglo-Saxon economies (Griffith-Jones and Karwowski, 2015; Karwowski and 
Stockhammer, 2017). Crucially, the two processes are interconnected since NFCs’ finan-
cial investment includes foreign capital inflows to purchase property assets (Karwowski, 
2018). The housing bubble has since collapsed (2007–8) leading to a decline in mortgage 
indebtedness.
All things considered, the trajectory of the private sector labour share reflects the 
economic and political changes over the period under consideration (see Figure 1). The 
early secular decline in the wage share appears to be consistent with the turbulent years 
associated with intense industrial and armed conflict. In contrast, the relative stability of 
the early democratisation years can potentially explain the temporary stabilisation of the 
private sector wage share, and the globalisation and financialisation shocks are prima 
facie explanations of the steep decline that followed. The increase of the labour share 
between 2009 and 2015 may correspond to the decrease in mortgage debt and to the 
construction and tourism boom associated with the 2010 FIFA World Cup that took place 
in South Africa. We test these hypotheses in the Findings section.
Research methodology and data sources
Empirical design and econometric approach
Building on the political economy analysis of the South African power relations and the 
theoretical postulates presented in the previous sections, we proceed to the econometric 
analysis of the determinants of functional income inequality in South Africa between 
1973 and 2018. The baseline econometric specification is as follows:
PWS f LM PUB GLOB FIN HUM DEM REVOLT= ( , , , , , , )  (1)
where:
•	 PWS is the private sector wage share (see Figure 1). We use the private sector 
wage share to minimise endogeneity biases that arise due to the use of government 
consumption, in the absence of welfare spending series.
•	 LM is labour militancy proxied by the number of strikes and lockouts (total econ-
omy), which is expected to exhibit positive effects on the wage share, depicting 
primarily the growth of the black trade union movement.
•	 PUB is public spending measured by government consumption (share of GDP). 
Given the history of discriminatory public welfare expenditures in South Africa 
and narrow welfare reforms in the post-democratisation period, we do not expect 
government consumption to increase the private sector wage share as in the stand-
ard literature.
•	 GLOB is trade globalisation proxied by trade openness (imports plus exports as a 
share of GDP), which is the most common proxy used in the literature. Given the 
discussion in the previous section, we expect a negative coefficient.
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•	 FIN is financialisation proxied by the size of the finance, insurance and real estate 
(FIRE) sector (gross value added as a share of GDP). Given the extent of finan-
cialisation in the country and the weak labour market institutions, we expect FIRE 
to increase inequality.
•	 HUM is human capital development proxied by the Human Capital Index (based 
on average years of schooling and assumed rates of return to education), which is 
expected to positively affect labour.
•	 DEM is a time dummy variable that controls for the post-apartheid period (1994–
2018). Since democratisation empowers a larger number of people and is related 
to inclusiveness (Scheve and Stasavage, 2009), we expect a positive coefficient.
•	 REVOLT is a time dummy variable that controls for the 1976–77 ‘Soweto upris-
ing’ and the 1984–86 popular rebellion led by black students and trade unionists 
(see Murray, 1989).4 Since the majority of the working class population in South 
Africa is black, we expect positive effects on the wage share.
Given the single-equation design of our study, we use the Unrestricted Error Correction 
Model (UECM) (Davidson et al., 1978; Sargan, 1964), which is widely used in empirical 
wage share studies (Bengtsson, 2014; Flaherty and Ó Riain, 2020; Gouzoulis, 2021; 
Gouzoulis and Constantine, 2021; Kristal, 2010). This approach largely addresses the 
usual serial correlation issues, especially in the context of macro-level and small sample 
size studies.5 The UECM includes both the long-run (level) and the short-run (first-dif-
ferenced) coefficients of the independent variables as follows:














where the vector x  includes the lagged independent variables, the vector ϕ  includes the 
lagged dependent variable, the independent variables and the growth rate. The latter is 
incorporated to control for the cyclicality of the private sector wage share, whilst β0  and 
ε t  are the constant and the error terms, respectively. Τhe long-run coefficients are lagged 
to prevent simultaneity issues and capture the direction of causality, as in all relevant 
empirical studies. Given our long-run 45-year period focus, we are particularly interested 
in the long-run coefficients.
There are two preconditions for the use of the UECM: (1) all variables must be sta-
tionary at either levels or first differences; (2) the dependent and independent variables 
must have a cointegrating long-run relationship. As reported in the Appendix, all varia-
bles that we use are either I(0) or I(1). Moreover, after estimating the stationary regres-
sion between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, we find that its 
residuals are stationary, which constitutes evidence of a cointegrating relationship. 
Therefore, both requirements are satisfied.
Alternative specifications and robustness checks
Beyond the explanatory variables of the baseline equation, we experiment with several 
additional variables to evaluate alternative channels that influence functional income 
inequality and the robustness/sensitivity of the baseline findings.
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In specification (2), we replace Trade Openness and the FIRE Sector with FDI Inflows 
(Net; share of GDP) to evaluate whether attempts to attract foreign capital increased 
inequality. In specification (3), we replace Trade Openness with Exports Diversification 
(Overall [Theil] Index) to explore how the structural transformation of the economy 
affects the labour share. We do not include both indicators in the same specification since 
export diversification is expected to increase exports and affect overall trade openness. 
In specification (4), we replace Trade Openness with the Nominal Exchange Rate (Local 
currency unit per US$) to assess how the abolition of exchange controls after apartheid 
affected income distribution. In specification (5), we replace FIRE Sector with the 
Mortgage Debt Ratio (Total mortgage advances of households and non-profit institutions 
serving households [NPISHs] over the disposable household income) to explore whether 
the post-1990s debt-fuelled housing bubble decreased the wage share as in many 
advanced liberal market economies. In specifications (6) and (7), we replace the FIRE 
Sector with Financial Development (Index) and the Chinn–Ito Index (Capital account 
openness) respectively, as alternative proxies for domestic and international financial 
liberalisation. In specification (8), we replace the Human Capital Index with the 
Unemployment Rate to examine if the remarkably high unemployment rate in the coun-
try increased inequality. While the two variables measure different channels, we do not 
include them in the same specifications as education influences employment opportuni-
ties (Cairó and Cajner, 2018). Despite data reliability having improved due to efforts to 
deracialise and normalise labour statistics since 1999, some caution is advised in inter-
preting any results related to unemployment (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2020).
In specification (9), we replace the Human Capital Index with the Capital–Labour 
Ratio (Average) to account for changes in relative factor endowments. In specifications 
(10) and (11), we replace the Human Capital Index with Industry (Value-added) and 
Urbanisation (Share of total population), respectively, to assess the potential distribu-
tional consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation following Lewis (1954). In these 
specifications, we drop human capital development given the nexus among skill attain-
ment, capital intensity and industrialisation (Allais, 2020). The same holds for urbanisa-
tion (Bertinelli and Zou, 2008), especially in the context of South Africa’s rural–urban 
divide in welfare provision. In specification (12), we replace Strike Activity with 
Redundancy Pay (Legally mandated redundancy compensation [time dummy]) as a proxy 
for labour market social safety nets that decrease inequalities. In specification (13), we 
add the WBL Index (Women Business and the Law Index Score [scale 1–100]) as a proxy 
for gender equality in the business sector. In specification (14), we add Remittances 
(Received; share of GDP) to examine whether payments received from abroad increase or 
decrease inequality. In specification (15), we add the IPCG Tax (Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains; share of revenue) to evaluate whether income taxation has been pro-
labour. Finally, in specification (16), we add Natural Resources Rents (Share of GDP) to 
examine the potential distributional effects of mineral reserve exploitation.
Data sources
The series for Public Consumption, Trade Openness, FDI Inflows, Nominal Exchange 
Rate, Industry, Urbanisation, Remittances, WBL Index, IPCG Tax and Natural Resources 
Rents are sourced from the World Bank Indicators. The proxy for Strike Activity comes 
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from the ILO database, whilst Exports Diversification, Financial Development and 
Unemployment Rate are sourced from the IMF. Redundancy Pay comes from Armour 
et al. (2016), whereas the data source for the FIRE Sector, Mortgage Debt Ratio and 
Capital–Labour Ratio is the SARB database. Finally, the Human Capital Index and the 
Chinn–Ito Index were obtained from Feenstra et al. (2015) and Chinn and Ito (2006), 
respectively. The final dataset covers the period 1971–2019 and the data were obtained 
on 11 November 2020. Further descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.
Results and discussion
Table 1 reports the main econometric findings. In specification (1), the FIRE Sector, 
Human Capital Index and Trade Openness have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant at the 1% or 0.1% levels. Public Consumption exhibits a negative impact on 
the private labour share and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. In specification 
(2), Strike Activity, Human Capital Index and FDI Inflows have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The sign of Public Consumption remains 
similar to the baseline result and statistically significant at the 1% level. In specification 
(3), Exports Diversification has the anticipated positive effect on the private sector wage 
share, while Strike Activity and FIRE Sector keep their expected signs. All three coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Adding the Nominal Exchange Rate in 
specification (4) does not affect the long-run signs of Strike Activity, FIRE Sector and 
Human Capital Index in terms of signs, magnitude and statistical significance. Yet, the 
new variable does not exhibit a significant impact on the labour share.
In specifications (5) and (6), where we test the effects of alternative finance indicators, the 
remaining long-run coefficients are unchanged as compared to the baseline specification. The 
Mortgage Debt Ratio decreases the private sector wage share, with its long-run coefficient 
statistically significant at the 1% level, whilst Financial Development has the expected nega-
tive effect but is statistically insignificant. Further, in specification (7), we find that the 
Chinn–Ito Index exerts a positive impact and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
remaining coefficients do not change signs, but only Human Capital Index is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In specification (8), including Unemployment Rate affects the 
statistical significance of other control factors. Unemployment itself is found to decrease the 
private sector labour share and is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, this find-
ing must be viewed with some caution, given the long-standing issues with the calculation of 
this indicator in South Africa (Alenda-Demoutiez and Mügge, 2020).
Table 2 reports the additional econometric findings. In specifications (9) and (10), replac-
ing Human Capital Index with Capital–Labour Ratio and Industry, respectively, does not 
affect the signs of Strike Activity, Trade Openness and Public Consumption as compared to 
the baseline findings. Yet, only the former two coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. Capital–Labour Ratio exhibits a positive and statistically 
significant effect (0.1% level) on the private sector labour share, whereas the sign of Industry 
is also positive but statistically insignificant. In specification (12), where we replace Strike 
Activity with Redundancy Pay, the remaining long-run coefficients are similar to the base-
line results in terms of sign and statistical significance, except for Trade Openness that 
becomes statistically non-significant. Redundancy Pay has the expected positive long-run 
Gouzoulis et al. 15
impact but it is not statistically significant. Finally, in specifications (13) to (16), the long-
run coefficients remain unchanged as compared to the baseline model. Trade Openness, 
FIRE Sector and Human Capital Index are statistically significant at the 1% or 0.1% levels 
in all four specifications. Public Consumption and Strike Activity are statistically significant 
in equations (13), (14) and (16), and in (14), respectively. All additional control variables in 
these specifications exhibit the expected effects but are statistically insignificant.
Regarding post-estimations diagnostics, according to the Breusch–Godfrey and Harvey 
tests, only two out of 16 equations face some serial correlation or heteroscedasticity issues. 
Also, Variance Inflation Factors analysis indicates no multicollinearity problems in our 
Table 1. Main results.




–2.07*** –1.02*** –1.65*** –1.57*** –2.26*** –1.24*** –1.28*** –0.37
Strike Activityt-1 0.42 0.52*** 0.46* 0.54* 0.80*** 0.59** 0.26 0.28
Public 
Consumptiont-1
–1.01*** –0.80** –0.35 –0.29 –2.39*** –1.65*** –0.34 –0.36
Trade Opennesst-1 –0.78** –1.51*** –1.06** –0.22
FIRE Sectort-1 –3.15*** –1.34* –3.36*** 0.96
Human Capital 
Indext-1
3.66*** 0.72*** 2.98*** 2.59*** 2.73*** 0.82**  



















0.14 0.25 0.63 0.14* 0.07 0.28 –0.25 0.15
Revolts Dummy 0.33*** 0.13 0.20* 0.23* 0.40*** –0.01 0.12 –0.22
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.65 0.63 0.40 0.24
BG test 0.05 0.42 0.13 0.07 0.25 0.31 0.39 0.48
Harvey test 0.66 0.41 0.60 0.67 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.25
Observations 45 45 42 45 42 37 45 38
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the private sector wage share in first differences. The coefficients are standardised by multiply-
ing the obtained coefficient with the ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable over the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. Breusch–Godfrey (BG) test at second lag (p-values reported). 
Constant terms and short-run (first-differenced) coefficients are included, but not reported.
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specifications. These tests underline the statistical robustness of our econometrics results. 
All things considered, our quantitative findings provide robust evidence that globalisation 
and financialisation have decreased the South African private sector wage share since 
1970, whilst human capital development has exhibited positive effects on it. Labour mili-
tancy and public spending are found to play important but relatively limited roles.
Conclusion
This study finds strong evidence that trade globalisation, financialisation (mortgage 
debt, FDI inflows and the FIRE sectors) and public consumption lower the South African 
Table 2. Additional estimations.




–1.45*** –0.30 –1.43** –2.16*** –2.12*** –2.11*** –2.03*** –2.26***
Strike Activityt-1 0.54** 0.24 0.70** 0.44 0.72* 0.46 0.32
Public  
Consumptiont-1
–1.74 –0.72 –0.56 –0.65* –1.09** –1.07** –1.15 –0.75**
Trade Opennesst-1 –0.85* 0.01 –0.08 –0.88 –0.80* –0.81* –0.79* –0.52*
FIRE Sectort-1 0.87 0.81 –2.82* –2.67** –3.54*** –3.97*** –3.05** –3.56***
Human Capital 
Indext-1




Industryt-1 0.58  
Urbanisationt-1 3.59**  
Redundancy Payt-1 0.38  
WBL Indext-1 0.56  
Remittancest-1 0.63  






0.66** 0.31 –0.54 0.00 –0.07 0.21 0.18 –0.07
Revolts Dummy 0.21 –0.03 0.38 0.28 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.34* 0.32***
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.55 0.45 0.51 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.71
BG test 0.66 0.12 0.43 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.13
Harvey test 0.25 0.00 058 0.00 0.86 0.67 0.34 0.20
Observations 46 46 46 41 45 45 45 45
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the private sector wage share in first differences. The coefficients are standardised by multiply-
ing the obtained coefficient with the ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable over the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. Breusch–Godfrey (BG) test at second lag (p-values reported). 
Constant terms and short-run (first-differenced) coefficients are included, but not reported.
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private sector wage share since 1971. Crucial reforms on trade, finance and welfare were 
undertaken after the democratisation period of 1994, but we find little evidence that the 
extension of the franchise increased the labour share. Human capital development, union 
strike activity and periodic revolts against apartheid lower functional income inequality, 
but their impact has been insufficient compared to the effects of globalisation and 
financialisation.
These results are instructive on several fronts. South African democracy is not redis-
tributive – this is a striking finding given the implicit political promise of the African 
National Congress. While we do not explicitly investigate the racial distribution of the 
private sector wage share, we expect black South Africans to be disproportionately 
affected by a contraction in the labour share, as they represent approximately two-thirds 
of the employed. It follows that more research is needed on the political empowerment 
of minorities or majorities (in the South African case), and the reduction of extreme 
inequalities across races.
Unlike the standard result in relatively homogeneous societies, public consumption 
lowers the South African labour wage share. In post-apartheid South Africa, the ‘Growth 
Employment and Redistribution Macroeconomic Strategy’ was underpinned by fiscal 
austerity (Streak, 2004). Indeed, public welfare coverage expanded in democratic South 
Africa, but the key dimensions of the welfare state that matter for wage bargaining were 
absent. This demonstrates how the unfortunate coincidence of a non-redistributive dem-
ocratic transition and certain economic reforms, e.g. fiscal austerity, conspired to increase 
functional income inequality. It follows that policymakers must be cognisant of timing 
and the prevailing global policy winds when they undertake deep structural reforms.
Overall, the positive effects of schooling, strike activity and revolts were insufficient 
to overcome the adverse effects of trade globalisation, financialisation and public con-
sumption on the private sector wage share. This shows that schooling and industrial 
actions are equalisers, but not enough when a society is racially divided in terms of capi-
tal ownership and unionisation, and/or when policy betrays political promises.
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Notes
1. Given that, by definition, the government sector is non-profitable (thus, 
its wage share [GWS] is 100%), the private sector wage share (PWS) is: 
WS GCONS PWS GCONS GWS PWS WS GCONS GCONS= − + ⇒ = − −( ) * * ( ) / ( )1 1 .
2. For similar reasons, this approximation is also used by Gouzoulis (2021) and Chortareas and 
Noikokyris (2021), while the seminal study of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) centres 
only on the corporate sector labour share.
3. The fall of the Communist bloc and the market-oriented reforms in China in the early 1990s 
contributed to ANC’s moderation.
4. It should be noted that this proxy include revolts against apartheid and not others like the post-
apartheid service delivery protests that are partly captured as part of strike activity.
5. Additionally, to prevent serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problems, we estimate the 
UECM specifications through the Newey and West (1987) estimator.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics, unit root tests and data sources.




Private Wage Share 43.61 52.58 36.56 4.48 49 0.23 0.00
Strike Activity 340.31 1324.00 47.00 343.50 48 0.00 0.00
Public Consumption 17.57 21.30 11.11 2.90 49 0.67 0.00
Trade Openness 52.93 72.87 37.49 7.69 49 0.00 0.00
FIRE Sector 15.45 20.80 11.68 2.97 49 0.16 0.00
Human Capital Index 2.11 2.81 1.80 0.30 47 0.99 0.00
FDI Inflows 0.82 5.98 –0.84 1.19 49 0.00 0.00
Exports Diversification 2.18 2.72 1.78 0.25 44 0.96 0.00
Nominal Exchange Rate 5.14 14.71 0.68 4.19 49 0.39 0.00
Mortgage Debt Ratio 54.06 84.30 39.74 9.93 45 0.69 0.00
Financial Development 0.45 0.65 0.30 0.12 39 0.26 0.00
Chinn–Ito Index –1.24 –0.15 –1.92 0.53 48 0.01 0.00
Unemployment Rate 21.48 28.70 9.24 5.26 40 0.34 0.00
Capital–Labour Ratio 367636.70 413160.00 320471.00 29388.16 49 0.53 0.00
Industry 32.93 45.28 25.85 5.87 49 0.27 0.00
Urbanisation 55.30 66.86 47.87 6.28 49 0.13 0.00
Redundancy Pay 0.10 0.25 0.00 0.12 43 0.00 0.00
WBL Index 55.72 88.10 25.60 24.79 49 0.00 0.00
Remittances 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.09 49 0.00 0.00
IPCG Tax 51.82 59.86 46.81 3.10 47 0.02 0.00
Natural Resources Rents 6.08 14.57 2.26 2.87 48 0.49 0.00
Post-Apartheid Dummy 0.53 1.00 0.00 0.50 49 0.00 0.00
Revolts Dummy 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.31 49 0.00 0.00
Notes: Due to the presence of innovation outliers, we test for unit roots using the Perron (1997) Break-
point (PBP) procedure, including intercept and trend. Test values reported are p-values.
